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Introduction
In a non-altruistic OLG closed economy, where land serves as an input as well as an asset, and land and labor are inelastically supplied, a tax on land rent is associated with higher capital stock and output per person in the steady state. This result is discovered by Feldstein (1977) . The rationale for this result is that a land tax hike, by initially reducing the value of land, diverts savings away from land into real capital, therefore spurring capital accumulation and temporarily output growth. The increase in capital stock in turn lowers the real interest rate (whose fall, if sufficiently strong, may even induce a rise in the land price in the after-shock equilibrium) and raises the marginal productivity of land as well as the wage rate. Steady state financial wealth, consumption and welfare rise. 1 The positive effect of the land rent tax on capital formation, which can be denominated the "Feldstein effect", is grounded in the portfolio choices.
Since capital and land are the only assets of the economy, any "flight from 1 The primary purpose of the Feldstein (1977) analysis was to demonstrate that within an intertemporal setting, where the supply of capital is endogenous through saving decisions, the Ricardian proposition that a tax on pure rent is unshifted is violated. Calvo-Kotlikoff-Rodriguez (1979) demonstrate that the Feldstein findings depend on the non-Ricardian (in the demographic sense) structure of the economy considered, by showing that in a Barro-Ramsey economy a tax on land rent is fully capitalized in the price of land and no tax shifting occurs as originally predicted by Ricardo. See also Kotlikoff-Summers (1987). land", determined by the land rent tax, is by necessity a "flight into real capital". 2 In a finite-lived small open economy facing a perfect world capital market and having a fixed labor supply, savings diverted from land by a rise in land taxation are not canalized into real capital. This is shown by Eaton (1988) who discovers that within such an economy a compensated land tax leaves capital stock, domestic output and non-land input prices unaffected. The land tax however reduces the price of land, crowds out foreign investment and hence raises national income as well as consumption and welfare of nationals. 3 There is nothing surprising in these findings. In fact, even if the economy analyzed by Eaton (1988) is in principle a three-asset economy (as net foreign assets are introduced in the asset menu of savers in addition to physical capital and land), it de facto works as a two-asset economy, as capital stock is tied down by the given world interest rate. Within a small open economy with perfect capital mobility, the portfolio mechanism discovered by Feldstein is still in existence but implies that the "flight from land" necessarily determines a "flight into foreign assets", given the capital stock black-out.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effects of a land rent tax on capital formation and foreign investment within a life-cycle small open economy where capital stock is unblocked from the world interest rate uni-2 The "Feldstein effect" is independent of alternative uses of land tax revenues. Whether land tax proceeds are lump-sum transferred to consumers or spent to increase unproductive government spending or used to reduce labor taxes is inconsequential for the qualitative consequences of the land tax on the resource allocation. 3 The effects of land taxation is only one of the multiple issues investigated by Eaton (1988) . 4 lateral peg by considering endogenous labor-leisure choices. By extending the analysis provided by Eaton (1988) , we investigate whether the direction of the "flight from land" can involve real capital other than net foreign assets, when the world interest rate fixes capital intensity, but no longer capital stock as both capital and labor are endogenously determined.
We discover that the consequences of land rent taxation differ substantially from those predicted by Feldstein (1977) and Eaton (1988) The consumers' behavior is obtained by using the OLG demographics with uncertain lifetime and no bequest motives formulated by Yaari (1965) and Blanchard (1985) , extended to incorporate endogenous labor-leisure choices, as in Phelps (1994, ch. 16) . 5 Agents face a constant mortality rate θ. New cohorts are born continuously. As the birth rate is assumed to equal the death rate, population, composed of cohorts of different ages, remains constant and hence can be normalized to one.
Assuming logarithmic preferences, the demand-side of the economy is 4 It could be alternatively assumed without altering the equilibrium that the stock of capital and land are owned entirely by domestic residents, who could always borrow abroad to bring about the current portfolio allocation. 5 The analysis of Eaton (1988) is instead based on the Samuelson-Diamond specification of the overlapping-generations structure. 6 described by the following aggregate relationships 6
where C is aggregate consumption, V d financial wealth of nationals, L labor hours, w real wage, Z lump-sum transfers from the government, r * the given world interest rate, ρ the exogenous rate of time preference, τ the labor income tax rate and α ² (0, 1) a preference parameter.
Equation ( Financial wealth of domestic residents is composed of two perfectly substitutable assets, i.e. physical capital K d and unimproved land T d ; that is 6 The derivation of sub-system (1) is described in Appendix A of the Mathematical Supplement. 7 As the stock of financial wealth held by nationals is assumed to be strictly positive, the steady state equilibrium requires r * > ρ. This condition guarantees that individuals save initially more and have an increasing profile of consumption.
where q is the price of land.
After-tax rates of return of perfectly substitutable assets must satisfy the following relationship
where λ is a proportional tax rate on land rent, R represents the land reward and perfect foresight has been assumed.
Domestic output Y is produced by competitive firms through the following well-behaved and linearly homogeneous production function:
where K and T represent total capital stock and land, respectively. Factors of production are complementary in the Edgeworth sense.
Total capital and land are defined as
where K f and T f are capital and land owned by foreigners, respectively.
First-order conditions for maximum profit entail
The economy has a fixed endowment of unimproved land, ∼ T , fully used in production. Land endowment is normalized to one, i.e. ∼ T = 1.
Government uses revenues from taxing land rents and labor income to
finance lump-sum transfers to consumers and unproductive public spending
The current account gives the rate of accumulation of foreign investment:
where B denotes foreign investment, i.e. the value of capital and land held by foreigners, defined as
The full model of the economy is obtained by combining the optimality conditions for consumers and firms together with the equilibrium condition on factor markets and the relevant equations of accumulation.
Our study of the macroeconomic consequences of land taxation is only concerned with a situation of steady state equilibrium. 9
3 Land taxation and resource allocation Three alternative policy-experiments concerning the effects of a parametric change in λ are studied: one in which the government distributes the revenues from taxation to consumers in a lump-sum fashion, one in which the additional tax proceeds are used for financing an increase in public expenditure, and one in which land tax revenues are employed to reduce the labor income tax rate.
Lump-sum distribution of land tax revenues
In this experiment, the rise in the land tax is accompanied by the lump-sum distribution of the land tax proceeds. Government expenditure and the labor income tax rate are fixed at ∼ G and ∼ τ respectively.
In the present economy, the marginal productivity of capital is fixed by the world interest rate according to equation (4a). From (4a), we obtain
where overbars denote long-run values and l 0 = − F KK F KL > 0.
Substituting (8) into (1b) for L , we can express consumption in terms of capital stock and the labor income tax rate as follows
The current account balance implies that
Substituting (10) into (11) for K + q − B and using (8), we obtain
Differentiating equations (9) and (12) yields
Saddle-point stability of the steady state equilibrium is satisfied as long as ∆ < 0. 8 Thus a compensated rise in the land tax leads to lower capital stock and higher consumption. The reduction of capital goes together with a contraction of labor hours from (8), while the rise in consumption is accompanied by an expansion of national wealth from (10). The reduction of capital implies that the before-tax return on land falls, while the wage rate rises. 9 The price of land falls more than the capitalized amount of the tax because of the reduction of the marginal productivity of land. Moreover, since domestic wealth K + q is reduced and national wealth K + q − B is increased, a reduction of foreign investment takes place.
In this setup, the effects of land taxation on financial wealth and consumption deriving from the non-Ricardian demographic structure of the economy are not surprising, even if they are greatly simplified, compared to the closed economy, by the capital price invariance. What turns out to be rather un-
conventional in this open economy environment are the consequences upon the factors of production.
The rationale for the effects on financial wealth and consumption, and the reverse "Feldstein effect" on capital stock is as follows. When there are finite lives with new births, a higher compensated land tax, implying greater lumpsum transfers distributed by the government to consumers, causes a redistribution of income from those who consume more and save less (the "older" ones) to those who consume less and save more (the "younger" ones). This leads to higher aggregate savings and financial wealth accumulation is therefore spurred. The rise in financial wealth brings aggregate consumption up.
Higher consumption induces a higher demand for leisure and a lower supply of labor. Manhours are therefore reduced. Since the marginal productivity of capital is given, and labor and capital are Edgeworth complements, lower labor hours imply lower capital stock. 10 9 This is because we have, once (8) is taken into account, that R= R(K) and w= w(K),
Compensatory increase in government expenditure
When land tax revenues are used to finance an increase in government expenditure, the implications of the land tax can be easily understood as follows.
Equation (11) can be re-written by using the goverment budget constraint (5) as
where ∼ Z represents the exogenous lump-sum transfers.
Using (13) together with (10), we obtain
Equations (9) and (14), which jointly determine K and C , are independent of λ and G . Hence, a rise in the land tax rate accompanied by an increase in government spending leaves capital stock and consumption unchanged. Labor hours, national wealth, the before-tax land reward and the wage rate also remain unaffacted. As the gross land rental R is constant, the land price drops by exactly the fall in 1 − λ . Hence, the land rent tax is fully capitalized in the price of land.
Since capital stock does not change and the price of land is reduced, foreign investment must fall in order to keep national wealth constant. Moreover, while domestic output remains constant, national income is increased.
ratio is driven up as consumption increases more than the wage rate.
13
The increase in national income is entirely absorbed by the government.
Welfare of nationals remains unaltered. 11
Thus, when the government budget is balanced through the endogenous adjustment of government expenditure, long-run capital stock becomes independent of the land tax, since the intergenerational redistribution of income seen above is absent and so are the effects on aggregate savings, financial wealth, consumption and welfare.
Compensatory reduction in τ
Suppose now that the increase in the land tax is matched by the endogenous change in the labor tax rate so as to keep the government budget balanced.
Using the government budget constraint (5) together with equations (4) and (8), we obtain
From (9) and (12), after using the above expression for d τ dλ , we get The rise in λ, by inducing a reduction of the wage income tax, redistributes income between the living generations and the yet to be born ones. This mechanism, which works through a human wealth channel, leads to higher aggregate savings; 14 the stock of financial wealth is therefore expanded. Consequently, consumption is driven up and labor supply is reduced. On the other hand, the rise in λ, implying for a given capital stock an increase in 15 capital stock is determined by which of these two antitethic effects dominate.
From a mechanical perspective, it can be observed that, since consumption and the after-tax wage are increased by the fall in τ , the net effect of λ on labor and hence capital depends, according to (1b), on whether the consumption-to-after-tax-wage ratio increases or not. If the effect of the land tax on C (1− τ ) w is positive, namely consumption rises more than net wage, labor hours fall and capital stock is contracted, since the intergenerational redistributive effect dominates the substitution effect; in this case, the qualitative consequences on the whole system are the same as those seen in Subsection 3.1. If instead, the after-tax wage rate increases more than consumption, leisure is reduced while labor is stimulated as the magnitude of the substitution effect prevails over the magnitude of the intergenerational redistributive effect; the rise in manhours in turn increases capital stock.
Foreign investment may either rise or fall.
Conclusions
This paper has investigated the consequences of taxing a fixed asset, i.e. unimproved land, on wealth accumulation and economic growth within a small open economy model that incorporates overlapping-generations with new births and an endogenous labor supply.
We have shown that the hypothesis of inelastic labor choices is noninnocuous for the economic growth neutrality of a land tax obtained by Eaton (1988) , since in such a case capital stock is pinned down by the exogenous world interest rate. The consequences of land taxation upon the employ-ment of production factors change substantially when labor-leisure choices become elastic. In fact, an endogenous labor supply removes the capital stock black-out and introduces permanent effects of land taxation on capital stock and labor hours, by making the interaction among financial assets (namely capital, land and foreign assets) fully operative.
We depart from the Feldstein (1977) and Eaton (1988) 
where h(s, t) is the consumer's human wealth, given by
Aggregating over all the cohorts and omitting the time index, the demandside of the model can be expressed as
where capital letters denote aggregate variables of the corresponding individual variables 15 and aggregate time endowment has been normalized to one.
By using equations (A.4a), (A.4c) and (A.4d), the Blanchard-Yaari equation of motion for consumption can be easily obtained:
Thus, the aggregate behavior of consumers can be described by the subsystem (A.4a'), (A.4b) and (A.4d) as indicated in Section 2 of the paper. 15 Each aggregate variable is defined as The short-run model can be written as
Since we are considering the case of a lump-sum distribution of tax revenues, lump-sum transfers are obtained residually from the relationship:
Equations (B.1d) and (B.1e) can be solved, once linearized around the steady state, for L and K in terms of the dynamic variable C to yield L = n(C), n 0 < 0 (B.2a) 1a)-(B.1c ), 17 the model can be reduced to the following system of differential equations linearized around the steady state
The transition matrix must have two positive eigenvalues associated with the jump variables C and q, and one negative eigenvalue associated with the predetermined variable B. 18 16 The expressions for l 0 and c K , given in Subsection 3.1, are: . 18 Since C adjusts on impact, K (hence L) jumps instantaneously as well, provided we assume, as in Mundell (1957) and Obstfeld (1989) , that capital is instantaneously and costlessly mobile across borders. By considering foreign investment B = K f + qT f a predetermined variable, we are implictly assuming that as q moves repentinely K f adjusts instantaneously as well, but in an opposite direction so as to leave B unchanged on impact (note that T f is also predetermined).
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The determinant and the trace of the above Jacobian are
The determinant must be negative as a necessary and sufficient condition for saddle-point stability since the trace is necessarily positive. This condition implies that, once the relationship
is taken taken into account, the following in-
Therefore the condition ∆ < 0 ensures that the steady state equilibrium is saddle-point stable as stated in Subsection 3.1.
Appendix C
Compensatory reduction in τ : Analysis of stability
The complete short-run model is given by
Equation (C.1f) has been obtained by solving the government budget constraint for τ . 19
Equations (C.1d) and (C.1e) can be solved, after linearizing around the steady state and taking (C.1f) into account, for L and K in terms of C as follows 19 The exogenous effect of λ on τ has been omitted for simplicity.
Substituting out the values of L and K from equations (C.2) into equations (C.1a)-(C.1c), the model can be reduced to the following system of differential equations linearized around the steady state
The transition matrix must admit two positive eigenvalues associated with C and q and one negative eigenvalue associated with B.
Since the trace of the coefficient matrix in (C.3) is positive, the determinant, given by
, 25 must be negative. This condition is satisfied if the following expression 
